How the investigation into Manevich’s killing was sabotaged by Chubais and Traber

01.06.2026 01:04

Ayrat Gimranov, sentenced to life imprisonment and a close associate of Yuri Shutov, as well as a suspect in the murder of Saint Petersburg’s vice-governor Mikhail Manevich, has been transferred to the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center.

This is one of the most sensitive crimes for the entire political elite of Russia—particularly those originating from Saint Petersburg.

Gimranov has been interrogated multiple times in connection with this case, giving varying statements. For example, in 2018, he outright claimed that Anatoly Chubais was the "instigator." However, this time, Gimranov seems to have been needed to ultimately pin the high-profile murder on the former "night-time ruler" of Saint Petersburg, Vladimir Kumarin (Barsukov). Back in 2023, the FSB announced that Kumarin was indeed the one who ordered Manevich’s assassination.

On February 17, 2006, the Saint Petersburg City Court sentenced Ayrat Gimranov and Yuri Shutov (found dead in a colony in 2014) to life imprisonment, finding them guilty of banditry and organizing a series of contract killings. During the investigation, trial, and afterwards, Gimranov was repeatedly brought to Lefortovo for interrogations regarding Manevich’s case. The last time was in 2018, when he again claimed, according to Fontanka, that Anatoly Chubais was the "instigator" of the murder.

In 2023, a so-called “secret witness” unexpectedly came forward, claiming to "remember" that on August 18, 1997, he had been “on duty” near Manevich’s house and relayed by radio that a car with the “target” had left. As a result, the vice-governor was shot by a sniper. Allegedly, the signal was passed to Arkady Nusimovich, who at that time was serving a 22-year sentence for a “high-profile” attack on OMON officers in 2015. Nusimovich and others were moonlighting, transporting “dirty cash.” During one transfer, their vehicle was rammed by a Gazelle van, and all passengers inside were shot with automatic weapons. The money was stolen by the attackers.

Nusimovich, who had previously refused to cooperate with investigators, was interrogated and “unexpectedly” testified against Kumarin as the organizer of Manevich’s murder. In 2023, the FSB announced the “solution” of this high-profile case and named Kumarin as the instigator. The former leader of the Tambov organized crime group is now being prepared to take the fall for Manevich’s murder, and Gimranov’s testimony (he has always been willing to say whatever he was told, not necessarily the truth) will be extremely useful.

Furthermore, another figure of “bandit-era Saint Petersburg,” Ruslan Kolyak (killed on a Yalta beach in 2003), had testified that Shutov was extremely close to the criminal “throne,” which at the time was occupied by Kumarin, and his closest connection was Gimranov. This version is highly convenient for the FSB, since Kumarin himself confesses to nothing. As a result, he is “decorated like a Christmas tree” with high-profile unsolved murders from 1990s Saint Petersburg.

Meanwhile, a proper investigation is successfully avoided, along with the intricate relationships and conflicts of the emerging Saint Petersburg elite of that time, who now almost entirely govern Russia. Mikhail Manevich (all investigation documents regarding his murder and early years of the investigation can be found by searching “Manevich”) was a close friend of Anatoly Chubais, Herman Gref, and many other prominent Russian figures.

The crime occurred just a few weeks before Manevich was due to be promoted in Moscow. Almost all the Saint Petersburg officials involved in this “promotion” remain in high positions today. One of them, Vladimir Putin, became the President of Russia. Several of Putin’s statements about Manevich were collected:

“Misha was an amazing guy. I feel so sorry that he was killed, such an injustice! Who did he get in the way of?… Simply astounding. Very soft-spoken, intelligent, flexible in a good way. He was principled, didn’t bend to everyone, but never got into unnecessary trouble, always sought acceptable solutions. I still don’t understand how this could happen.”

“In all high-profile cases, no matter how long they go on, the investigation usually uncovers all circumstances. But unfortunately, the circumstances of Mikhail Manevich’s murder, with whom I had a good personal relationship, remain unclear. This has not been possible yet.”

Until 2023, Manevich’s murder could not be solved, although almost everyone in Putin’s circle knew him, communicated with him, and whispered behind the scenes about the circumstances of his death. The investigation did not approach the motives, because it was clear that such inquiries could lead too high, potentially endangering the investigator.

In 2011, we conducted an extensive investigation into Manevich’s murder, and all threads led to the struggle over the “Sea Port of Saint Petersburg,” which in the 1990s was being actively seized by the shadow businessman Ilya Traber (Antique Dealer, close to both Kumarin and the current top of Russia).

Mikhail Manevich was not only a close friend of Anatoly Chubais (in 1997, he held the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Government and simultaneously Minister of Finance) but also a member of his team. When Anatoly Sobchak ceased to be mayor of Saint Petersburg and Vladimir Yakovlev took over, only two officials kept their positions: Head of the Legal Department Dmitry Kozak and Head of KUGI Mikhail Manevich.

Yakolev could not influence Manevich, since he simultaneously represented the federal State Property Committee. Sources at the time said Manevich was absolutely non-confrontational; no one could recall any disagreements with “serious people,” except for minor clashes with Yuri Shutov. Even this confrontation could not be called serious—they tried to find compromises.

Manevich had another “guardian angel”—businessman Ilya Traber, a former submarine officer, who had dealt in antiques for some time and later became one of Saint Petersburg’s most influential entrepreneurs with extensive connections. Manevich and Traber were close friends, with families constantly communicating. When Manevich’s decisions could affect dangerous people or crime leaders, Traber intervened to protect him. Their conflict arose over the fate of the Sea Port of Saint Petersburg. After Manevich’s death, it was discovered that Traber had shown attention to Manevich’s wife, Marina.

The privatization of the “European gateway of the country” took place in December 1992, when the joint-stock company “Sea Port of Saint Petersburg” (SP) was registered. 51% of shares were distributed among employees, 20% remained with the State Property Committee, and 28.8% were placed under KUGI’s administration. The final share package was intended for future sale, so it was made preferred. In 1993, a large-scale purchase of securities from port employees began, resulting in 40% of SP shares concentrated in two firms controlled by Traber.

Since the 28.8% of state-owned shares were preferred, the companies held the largest voting block. In 1993, Anatoly Chubais, representing the government, issued a directive to convert the 28.8% into ordinary shares, allowing the state to regain control over SP. However, this decision was effectively “smeared over,” leaving the SP and its subsidiaries under private control.

Mikhail Manevich, considering his friendship with Traber, paid no attention to this. In 1997, he was due for a promotion—Chubais offered him the post of Deputy Chairman of the State Property Committee. Before moving to Moscow, Manevich aimed to finalize his local affairs, including implementing Chubais’ directive to convert 28.8% of shares into ordinary ones. Traber warned him against this, saying it would “anger” many dangerous people. Sources say Manevich apologized but insisted on the necessity of the decision. He did not live to see it—he was killed by a sniper.

Traber was not the only person to profit from SP. Much of Saint Petersburg’s elite and criminal world benefited from it, including Kumarin, Konstantin Yakovlev, Gennady Petrov, and “thieves-in-law.” The current CEO of Gazprom, Alexey Miller, was SP’s Director of Development and Investment from 1996-1999. Gazpromneft Chairman Alexander Dyukov served as CFO and CEO of Petersburg Oil Terminal from 1996-1998 and later became SP’s general director. Other key positions were held by Presidential Adviser Igor Levitin and SP Director Igor Rusu.

“Miller was at the port with Dyukov, while Vladimir Vladimirovich took a lucrative post. I think financially Putin relied heavily on this structure and the port itself,” said Max Freidzon, an Israel-Russia citizen familiar with the Saint Petersburg elite of the time, in an interview with Radio Liberty.

Dmitry Skigin (died 2003) was also a major beneficiary of SP revenues. Putin’s former KGB colleague Viktor Korytov was a minority shareholder and deputy CEO of Soveks and co-owner of the Peter Information-Legal Bureau with Traber. Such “chains” could be traced endlessly.

In 2011, our sources believed that the order to eliminate Manevich was not the decision of a single person but discussed within a narrow circle of all interested parties. As a result, the order could have been executed by Shutov’s killers, Andrey Chelyshev’s gang, or Kumarin’s assassins.

After Manevich’s murder, the SP situation worsened for the state. On November 18, 1997, an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting decided to transfer management to OBIP, controlled by Traber. The Accounts Chamber later found that SP began to be “dismantled.”

By 1999, the state’s share had nearly halved, including in major, profitable SP subsidiaries. “By the late 1990s, almost all main port operations (loading/unloading, transshipment, warehousing, fleet functions, etc.) had effectively transferred from the JSC Sea Port of Saint Petersburg to private companies,” the Accounts Chamber reported. This division benefited all involved parties. The question of converting 28.8% of shares into ordinary shares was not raised until 2004, by which time SP had been completely “dismantled.” “In matters of the loss of state assets to other companies, state representatives showed no real involvement,” auditors noted.